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INTRODUCTION

Thurgood Marshall sits as an Associate Justice on the United
States Supreme Court, the only black person ever to do so. Before taking that office he served as the Solicitor General of the United States
and as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. In these offices he has been called upon to bring his powers of
judgment to bear on a multitude of matters concerning this Nation's
Constitution.1 His views on the Constitution, therefore, cannot be easily
* Assistant Professor, Louisiana State University Law Center; B.A. 1973, J.D. 1977, Yale University. The Author wishes to thank several colleagues at Louisiana State University and other
institutions who have read and commented on drafts of this Article: William B. Allen, Paul R.
Baier, John S. Baker, Joseph T. Bockrath, James W. Bowers, Robert J. Cottrol, John M. Devlin,
Paul Finkelman, Kenneth M. Murchison, Benjamin M. Shieber, and Eulis Simien, Jr. Additionally, the Author acknowledges the research assistance of Karen Hayne, Louisiana State University
Law Center Class of 1989.
1. Justice Marshall's judgment has been informed greatly by his experience in the segregated
South as the grandson of a slave and by his training at the Howard University School of Law-a
school dedicated in the early twentieth century to the establishment of a class of black lawyers
who would assault the shackles of racial discrimination and unfair treatment. True to that training
and to an ethic of racial advancement, Marshall became a young lawyer whose pursuit of his peo-
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dismissed.
The 200th anniversary of the Constitution was not only a time of
celebration, but also a time of widespread political debate over the
meaning of the Constitution's text and whether it should be construed
in keeping with the "original intent" of the Framers. Justice Marshall
chose this time to sound a discordant note to the self-congratulatory
theme of the bicentennial celebration. In a speech before the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association, Justice Marshall
presented a simple theme: That the Constitution as originally written
was profoundly racist.2
That the Constitution is a racist document is a powerful statement
and one demanding close scrutiny, especially since the Constitution
does not explicitly mention slavery and race and deals squarely with the
issue of slavery in only three places.3 Article I, section 2, clause 3 apportioned direct or capitation taxes and membership in the House of Representatives in accordance with population, but counted a slave as only
three-fifths of a person.4 Article I, section 9, clause 1 forbade Congress
to limit the importation of slaves until 1808, a period of twenty years. 5
pie's civil rights compromised his financial welfare until he received an appointment to the legal
staff of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which staff he later
headed until his appointment to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1961. Marshall
served as Solicitor General from 1965 until 1967, when he took his seat on the Supreme Court. See
R. BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAw, THE LEGAL CAREER OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
3, 11, 22, 130, 157, 178-179 (1973); M. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGRE-

1925-1950, at 30-31, 45-47 (1987).
Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document? 40
VAND. L. REV. 1337 (1987). Justice Marshall avoided use of the term "racist"; the gravamen of his
complaint respecting the Constitution, however, is that the Constitution actively tolerated slavery,
a virulent manifestation of racism.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The clause provides:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may
be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a
Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id. By extension, Article I, § 2, clause 3 affected the scheme of selecting the President and VicePresident, as defined in Article II, § 1, clause 2, which provided for their election by "a Number of
Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which [each] State may
be entitled in the Congress.. . ." Moreover, Article I, § 2, clause 3 was buttressed by Article I, § 9,
clause 4, which provided that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." Article V excluded both
Article I, § 2, clause 3 and Article I, § 9, clause 1 from amendment until 1808.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. The clause provides:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each Person.
Id.
GATED EDUCATION,

2.
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Article IV, section 2, clause 3 provided that fugitive slaves who escaped
into another state would be returned to their owners.' Historians universally concede that this treatment of slavery was the result of compromise between proslavery and antislavery forces at the Constitutional
Convention, represented largely by Southern and Northern States respectively. Without this compromise, the new Constitution and the
union of states that it represented might not have been possible.
This Article is intended to examine Justice Marshall's position
that, because of the manner in which the Constitution dealt with the
matter of race and slavery, the Constitution was "defective from the
start."7 Part II of this Article contrasts Justice Marshall's position on
the framing of the Constitution with the positions of his critics. Part III
argues that Justice Marshall's position is defensible even on broader
grounds than he articulated, for to a significant extent the role that
slavery played in the compromise that produced the Constitution cemented political control of the federal government in the hands of the
slave states. Part IV suggests some implications of the constitutional
compromise on slavery for the study of the Constitution and American
law.

II. THE MARSHALL THESIS AND ITS CRITICS
In his speech Justice Marshall refused to accept "a complacent belief that the vision of those who debated and compromised in Philadelphia yielded the 'more perfect Union'" that many claim we now enjoy.
Instead, he questioned the Framers' "wisdom, foresight, and sense of
justice," and found them not "particularly profound," indeed, morally
offensive.8 Marshall argued that the Framers of the Constitution deliberately ignored the interests of slaves and protected the institution of
slavery. Thus they compromised individual liberty to selfish economic
interest.' He concluded that the government devised by the Framers
was "defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil
war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and
human rights, we hold as fundamental today."'10 The Constitution as
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. The clause provides:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.

Id.
7.

Marshall, supra note 2, at 1338.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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originally framed not only was not color-blind in protecting individual
liberty, but also was consciously and intentionally oppressive with respect to color and race.
In support of his position Justice Marshall suggested an examination of the first three words of the Constitution, "We the People."
Slaves were not counted among "the People" who established the Constitution. Even while slaves were counted as three-fifths of a person for
purposes of determining the voting power of whites, the slaves themselves obtained no rights as persons and would remain ignored by the
federal government until the passage of the Civil War Amendments."
As the Constitution ignored the rights of slaves, it also perpetuated
the institution of slavery. Justice Marshall pointed out that the Constitution permitted the import trade in slaves to continue and even guaranteed that the trade would persist for at least twenty years. 12 Northern
States acceded to this demand in return for Southern support for the
commerce clause of the Constitution. Moreover, New Englanders employed in the "carrying trade" expected to profit from both the transport of slaves from Africa and the goods produced in America by
slaves. 13
Justice Marshall argued that the Constitution was not only oppressive to the rights of black slaves, but also oppressive to the rights of
free blacks.' 4 The Constitution carried with it the inherent contradiction "between guaranteeing liberty and justice for all, and denying both
to Negroes."15 In support of this statement Justice Marshall quoted
11. Id. at 1340-41; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, amend. XIV, § 1, amend. XV, § 1.
Section 1 to the thirteenth amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Section 1 to
the fourteenth amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 to the fifteenth amendment states: "The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
12. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1339; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. This guarantee was
underscored and further protected by the prohibition in Article V of the Constitution that the
importation clause might not be amended in any way prior to the year 1808. The slave importation
clause was not an insignificant concession, and contributed to the importation of "about as many
Africans ... into the United States during the thirty years from 1780 to 1810 as during the previous hundred and sixty years of the U.S. involvement in the slave trade." R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN,
TiME ON THE CROSs 24 (1974).
13. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1338.
14. Id. at 1340.
15. Id.
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Chief Justice Roger Taney's 1857 opinion in Scott v. Sandford,16 which
stated that blacks, both slave and free, "are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution,
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States."1
In fact, Chief Justice Taney opined that at the time of the framing of
the Constitution, blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect." 18
The constitution that Justice Marshall would celebrate, therefore,
is not the Constitution framed at the Philadelphia convention in 1787
and ratified by the states in the months that followed, but is instead a
different constitution, forged in the crucible of the Civil War, after
which the Union survived, but the Constitution did not. In its place
"arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality"-the fourteenth amendment-which "ensur[ed] protection of the life, liberty,
and property of all persons against deprivations without due process,
and guarantee[d] equal protection of the laws."' 9 To celebrate that first
Constitution, argued Justice Marshall, would be "little more than a
blind pilgrimage to the shrine of the original document."2 0 Instead, he
suggested the need for "a sensitive understanding of the Constitution's
inherent defects, and its promising evolution through 200 years of history." That evolution cannot be understood as occurring by the process of interpretation, but rather as the result of a revolution that came
in the form of amendments to the Constitution-amendments that
abolished slavery and ensured that citizens of all races would be equal
22
under the law.
In Justice Marshall's view, recognition of that revolution is necessary to celebrate the Constitution for what it truly is: A living document with a history both proud and ugly.23 That history includes
constitutional enslavement and, later, constitutional emancipation. The
history includes disenfranchisement and segregation under the Constitution, and later the beginnings of racial equality under the same document. 4 Because the consequences of slavery bore greatly on the
American Constitution and on American law, Justice Marshall argued
16. (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
17. Id. at 404.
18. Id. at 407. Chief Justice Taney's opinion on the citizenship of blacks holds only the status of dicta and is founded on questionable historical interpretation. See infra note 108.
19. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1340-41 (emphasis in original).
20. Id. at 1341.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1340-41.
23. Id. at 1341-42.
24. Id. at 1340-41.
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that to understand, to appreciate, and to celebrate the Constitution one
must consider the institution of slavery and the concessions the Framers made to it.2 5
Justice Marshall's views received immediate and extensive recognition in the media. Headlines throughout the country read similarly to
that in the Los Angeles Times: "Marshall on Constitution: 'Defective
from Start.' "26 The Marshall thesis instigated widespread response
from both public and private organizations and individuals.
The Washington Legal Foundation, for example, suggested that the
Justice resign his seat on the Supreme Court because his remarks "re27
flect[ed] a deepseated bitterness and dislike that impair his capacity.
The National Review suggested that Justice Marshall merely was ignorant of the peculiarities and limitations of eighteenth century liberalism
under which blacks, as Chief Justice Taney had indicated in 1857, were
the peculiar exception to the equality to which all men were otherwise
heirs.2"
The initial reactions of shock and dismay to Justice Marshall's
comments that the Framers and the document they produced were
morally deficient are understandable. Marshall's comments might well
seem incongruous, for they came at a time "dedicated to the memory of
the Founders, ' 29 whose "achievements ... knowledge and experience,"
as well as "the nature of the government they established, its origins, its
character, and its ends," had become the subject of reverent remembrance.30 Shock and dismay were precisely the initial reactions of Donald Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, who thought at first that "the
remarks were a gratuitous insult to our charter document and to such
Framers as Madison and Franklin, whose memories we honor." 1 Upon
further reflection and after reading the full text of Marshall's speech,
however, Secretary Hodel conceded that the Justice's remarks inspired
a different response. No honor was lost in recognizing that "the Constitution, as originally drafted, was not perfect in all respects. 3 2 The Constitution did, after all, condone slavery, and this condonation was one of
25. Id. at 1338.
26. L.A. Times, May 7, 1987, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
27. 102 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1987, at 12.
28. 39 NAT'L REV. 16 (1987).
29. COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, FIRST FULL
YEAR'S REPORT: PREPARATION FOR A COMMEMORATION 6 (Sept. 1986), quoted in Marshall, supra
note 2, at 1337.
30.

COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, FIRST REPORT 6

(Sept. 17, 1985), quoted in Marshall, supra note 2, at 1337.
31. D. Hodel, Remarks of the Secretary of the Interior at Ceremonies Dedicating the United
States Supreme Court Building as a Historical Landmark, Washington D.C., Dept. of the Interior
News Release, at 2 (May 12, 1987).
32. Id.
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the "significant failings of the original document."3 3 In Secretary Hodel's view, however, these failings were not cause for condemnation, because the Framers had created the amendment process for the express
purpose of correcting the Constitution's failings. 4
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, in a speech at Vanderbilt University, took a stance similar to Secretary Hodel's-a stance
critical of the Constitution's failings but, with the hindsight of history,
optimistic about the Constitution's capacity to accommodate change.35
The Constitution, Reynolds recognized,
was intended to be the culmination of a great struggle for the natural rights of men.
.. . When the Framers sought to protect in the Constitution the fundamental
rights of man but failed to guarantee explicitly those rights to every individual,
they introduced a self-contradiction that preordained struggles and conflicts we
continue to confront today. 6

Reynolds argued that "to be reminded of the compromise on slavery
during the making of the Constitution" was reasonable, but that it was
not reasonable to encourage the view of two constitutions-one framed
in 1787 and another that emerged from the Civil War's aftermath.3 7 According to Reynolds, it was our system of constitutional government,
"one of divided governmental authority and separated government
powers,"" that allowed the Civil War Amendments to be effective.
On the issue of slavery, Reynolds contended that "the Framers
were faced with a Hobson's choice," for consensus on the new Constitution required the assent of the Southern States." The Framers were
limited to settling for the maintenance of slavery in a constitutional
system that was amenable to slavery's elimination and sown with "the
seeds for the expansion of freedom to all individuals when circumstances would permit. ' 40 Moreover, the Justices on the Supreme Court
shared the blame with the Framers because of their "loose, disingenuous, and result-oriented" decisions such as the Scott v. Sandford.41 In
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1987)
[hereinafter Another View]. Another View is indeed a different view from Justice Marshall's, but
it is the same view that Reynolds has espoused previously. See Reynolds, Securing Liberty in an
EgalitarianAge, 52 Mo. L. REV. 585 (1987). But see Middleton, Securing Justice: A Response to
William Bradford Reynolds, 52 Mo. L. REV. 607 (1987).
36. Another View, supra note 35, at 1345.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1346.
39. Id. at 1347.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1348 (quoting Cooper & Lund, Landmarks of ConstitutionalInterpretation,40
POL'Y REV., Spring 1987, at 20).
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Scott the Court forewent the opportunity to extend the principles of
equality under the Constitution and instead allowed "the theoretical
opinions of individuals . . to control . . [the Constitution's]
meaning."4' 2
The confession and avoidance gloss on constitutional history elaborated by Secretary Hodel and Assistant Attorney General Reynolds was
typical of many of the responses to the Marshall thesis. Critics, however, were hard pressed to disagree that acceptance of and support for
the institution of slavery was an unfortunate facet of the 1787 Constitution. Yet that failing, the critics stressed, does not shatter the essential
greatness of the original document, because the moral compromise was
a political necessity; and more importantly, the compromise was pregnant with the means for outgrowing even this defect.
For example, Jack Valenti, writing in the New York Times, suggested that to omit the black and the slave from the protection of the
Constitution's umbrella of liberty was a necessary evil. Otherwise, the
issue of slavery "would [have] rupture[d] the unity so sorely required"
for the Constitutional Convention to succeed and the union of states to
survive. 43 Syndicated columnist Cal Thomas wrote that if Justice Marshall was right to argue that the Framers "believed liberty and equality
to be the exclusive preserve of white males," the Justice was nonetheless wrong to assert that the government devised by the Framers was
defective from the start.44 According to Thomas, "the Constitution's
real strength . . is derived from its grounding in a set of fixed absolutes"--absolutes that render the Constitution "a self-correcting document. '45 The amendment process, in conjunction with the ideological
absolutes of liberty, constitutes "one of the document's great
strengths. ' 46 Columnist Robert Akerman recognized that the Framers
demonstrated "a sacrifice of 'moral principles' to economic interests,"
yet he argued that the Framers should not be blamed, for "the 'moral
principles' of the age did not permit any tampering," and the Constitution did provide for an amending process through which "slavery could
have been abolished by amendment at any time the society was ready
to do it."' 47 Moreover, Akerman argued, the Framers had established a
structure of government under which "the will of the majority must be
42. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scot), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 620-21 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting), quoted in Another View, supra note 35, at 1348.
43. Valenti, Despite Slavery, a Constitution that Built a Nation, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1987,
at 27, col. 1 (city ed.).
44. Houston Post, May 15, 1987, at B2, col. 1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Akerman, Justice Marshall Takes Us Part of the Way to UnderstandingConstitution,
Atlanta Const., May 10, 1987, at C3, col. 1.
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enacted with due regard for minority rights. ' 48 These responses imply
that Marshall's thesis suffers from a selective focus on the molehill of
slavery and from a refusal, at best ignorant and at worst contumacious,
to recognize the mountain of greatness in the original Constitution.
The Atlanta Constitution called such critical comments the sounds
of "[l]esser men sniping at Justice Marshall" and opined that "[a]n appalling number of cheap righteousness points are being run up by persons willfully misunderstanding [Marshall's thoughts]. 14 9 This Article
takes no position on whether the critics' failure to understand was willful or even petty. This Article will show, however, that the failure of
understanding is real and substantial-that Justice Marshall's critics
rushed to judgment partially blinded by the dazzle of the bicentennial
celebration.
Part III will argue that the commentators have failed to reckon
with the details of the compromise on slavery. Thus, the commentators
have missed an otherwise inescapable conclusion: Even if the Constitution had within it the seeds of change, no change compromising the
institution of slavery and the economic interests that it represented
could take place without the consent of the slave states. At its core, the
original document was intended to place control over the levers of
change in the hands of those who could not be expected to permit the
institution of slavery to weaken. The Constitution, by design, delivered
political control of the federal government to the South. If the Constitution eventually changed to accomplish for blacks the individual liberties afforded to whites, it changed not because of an internal imperative
mandating the substitution of freedom for slavery, but instead because
of an extraconstitutional act of colossal proportions-the Civil War.
III.

ORIGINAL INTENT: PROTECTION FOR SOUTHERN INTERESTS IN
SLAVERY

None of the participants could have doubted that slavery would be
a subject of discussion at the Philadelphia convention. England's mainland colonies had developed a long history of slavery. In certain colonies, legislatures had sanctioned slavery soon after empirical experience
with the subject. Massachusetts, for example, sanctioned slavery in
1641, three years after the first recorded existence of slavery in the colony.5 0 In Carolina, before the first blacks arrived, the constitution
48. Id.
49. Lesser Men Sniping at Justice Marshall, Atlanta Const., May 16, 1987, at A18, col. 1.
50. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS:
THE COLONIAL PERIOD 61-62 (1978). John Winthrop's journal "of 1638 is apparently 'the earliest
recorded account of Negro slavery in New England.. . . Negroes may have been enslaved before
that time but earlier allusions to slavery are inferential and even contemporaries were apparently
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drafted for the governance of the colony that later became North Carolina and South Carolina 5 ' guaranteed the authority of every free person
over every slave. 2 Other states gradually adopted the institution of
slavery. The first blacks arrived in Virginia in 1619, before blacks had
arrived in Massachusetts, and although Virginia's legislature and courts
would deal on a piecemeal basis with problems occasioned by the existence of slavery,53 it was not until 1680 and 1682 that the colony passed
its first slave codes.5 In 1735, three years after the granting of Georgia's
charter, the trustees of that colony passed a law outlawing the use of
blacks as slaves. 5 The passage of this law did not mean that Georgians
were nonracialists, for concomitant to prohibiting slavery the trustees
banned the importation of all blacks into the colony. A scant fifteen
years later, in 1750, largely for economic reasons, Georgia repealed the
ban on slavery. A statute encouraging slavery was passed in its stead
and Georgia soon established one of the harshest slave codes of the
period.5
Even in 1776, when the statement "all men are created equal" was
etched into the consciousness and the conscience of America, the laws
of each of the states countenanced slavery.58 The ascendency of slavery,
however, was less complete in 1787, the year of the framing of the Constitution. Massachusetts had ended slavery through judicial interpretation of its constitution, which had provided that all men were "free and
equal.

' 59

Vermont, which became the Nation's fourteenth state, had

no more certain of the facts.'" Id. at 61 (quoting L. GREEN, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND, 1620-1776, at 17 (1942)). The 1641 Body of Liberties made an exception to its prohibition

against slavery so that slaves might be
lawful captives taken in juste warres, and such strangers as willfully sell themselves or are
sold to us. And these shall have all the liberties and Christian usages which the law of God
established in Israel concerning such persons doth morally require. This exempts none from
servitude who shall be judged thereto by Authoritie.
COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS REP. FROM 1660 SUPP. TO 1672, at 91 (1889), quoted in A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra, at 62.
51. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 153 & n.12.
52. The Fundamental Constitution of Carolina drawn up by John Locke, 1 S.C. Stats. at
Large 55 (Cooper 1936).
53. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 22-30, 32-38.
54. Act X (1680), reprinted in 2 Va. Stats. at Large 481 (Hening 1823); Act IH (1682), reprinted in id. at 492.
55.

1 A.

CANDLER, COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE

OF GEORGIA 50-52 (1904).

56. Id.
57. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 217, 236-66.
58.

D.

FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN

LAW AND POLI-

TICS 15-17 (1978).
59. The litigation that ended slavery in Massachusetts concerned the slave Quock Walker
and involved three cases: Walker v. Jennison (1781), reprinted in 1873-75 PROC. MASS. HIST. Soc.

296; Jennison v. Caldwell (1781), reprinted in id.; and Commonwealth v. Jennison (1783), reprinted in id. The cases are reproduced in 4 H. CATTERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN
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outlawed slavery explicitly in its constitution."0 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Connecticut each had passed gradual emancipation statutes
intended to eliminate slavery. 1 Delaware, Maryland, New York, New
Jersey, and Virginia had passed laws prohibiting the importation of
slaves within their borders.62 Abolitionist societies had been instituted
AND THE NEGRO 478-81 (1968). Article I of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
provided:
All men are free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their
safety and happiness.
MASS. CONST. art. I (1780), reprinted in MASS. GEN. STATS. 15 (1860). The provisions of the 1780
constitution were not such a far cry from the Massachusetts 1691 colonial charter, which mandated
that every inhabitant of the colony "shall enjoy all Liberties and Immunities of Free and naturall
[sic] Subjects." Charter of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay 1691, at 1, 14, reprintedin 1 ACTS
AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY, 1692-1714 (1869). Reported cases do not
reveal that slave status was ever challenged as a violation of the colonial charter or that the charter
was construed otherwise to prohibit slavery. See 4 H. CATTERALL, supra, at 465-81. Courts construing the free and equal clause of the constitution, however, had the benefit of Lord Mansfield's
opinion in Somerset v. Stewart, 12 Geo. 3 (Lofft 1772), reprintedin 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772),
which had declared that slavery lacked the support of positive law and was "so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support [it]." 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. See Wiecek, Somerset- Lord Mansfield
and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 115, 124-25
(1974). The Quock Walker litigation is described in A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 91-99; see
also Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More Notes on
the "Quack Walker Case," 5 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1961); O'Brien, Did the Jennison Case Outlaw Slavery in Massachusetts? 17 WM. & MARY Q. 219 (1960).
60. See 12 A. SOULE, STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT 8 (1964). Article I of the Declaration of
Rights in the Vermont Constitution of 1777 provided that "all men are born equally free and
independent," and forbade servitude for any male past the age of twenty-one and for any female
past the age of eighteen, "unless they are bound by their own consent, after they arrive at such
age, or bound by law, for the payment of debts, damages, fines, costs, or the like." Id.; see also A.
ZILvERsMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 116 (1967). But
compare the treatment by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of the "free and independent"
clause of the state's 1776 Declaration of Rights, in Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen & M.) 133
(1806). The Declaration of Rights declared
[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights,
of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or
divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring
and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
10 W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (1979). The Declaration of Rights, it was found, "was notoriously framed with a cautious eye [on the subject of
slaves], and was meant to embrace the case of free citizens or aliens only." Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen
& M.) at 141 (Tucker, J.). The court limited the application of the Declaration of Rights to "white
persons and native American Indians" and rejected the notion that the Declaration of Rights applied to "native Africans and their descendants, who have been and are now held as slaves." Id. at
144.
61. See W. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 23, 36, 37 (1965); see also P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY,
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 43-44 (1981).
62. See W. DuBois, supra note 61, at 12-15, 19, 24-25; see also P. FINKELMAN, supra note 61,
at 45; A. ZILVERSMIT, supra note 60, at 155.
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in several states,"3 and thoughtful Southerners found slavery to be a
questionable moral practice. 4 Some slaveholders even questioned the
economic benefits of slavery. 65 And some Americans, especially in the
North and the Mid-Atlantic South, hoped that slavery would gradually
disappear. 6
Yet slavery was still both a social and economic fact of American
life at the time of the Constitutional Convention. Slavery was of lesser
importance in the North, where the proportion of slaves to the free
population was small and where the economic impact of slavery was
minimal. Slavery was of much greater importance in the South, where
slavery's tremendous economic significance had spawned a slave population so great that it posed a threat to social control.6 7 As an important
aspect of American life, slavery warranted major consideration at the
Constitutional Convention.
A.

Representation in Congress and the Three-Fifths Clause

Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention believed
that one of the major faults of the Articles of Confederation was that
63. A. ZiLvERsMrr, supra note 60, at 147, 162-63, 173-74. Abolitionist societies already existed
in New York and Pennsylvania; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey established
societies by 1794. Id.
64. Patrick Henry of Virginia wrote of "an abhorrence of slavery," and was struck by the
inherent conflict in the existence of slavery "in a country, above all others, fond of liberty." Letter
from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), reprinted in H. COMMAGER & R. MORRIS,
THE SPmrr OF 'SEvENTY-SIx: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS
402 (1975). George Washington wrote of his desire for some plan of gradual abolition. Letter to
John Francis Mercer (Sept. 9, 1786), reprintedin 11 W. FORD, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 62 (1891). Thomas Jefferson, who had written in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence that slavery violated the "most sacred rights of life and liberty," Draft, Declaration of
Independence, reprinted in H. COMMAGER & R. MoRRIs, supra, at 316, believed that the "commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most
unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other. Indeed I tremble
for my country when I reflect that God is just. . . 1"20 A. LIPSCOMB & A. BERGH, THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 225-28 (1903), reprintedin B. MAYO, JEFFERSON HIMSELF: THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF A MANY-SIDED AMERICAN 35 (1942).
65. See 7 P. FORCE, AMERICAN ARCHIVES, 494, 523, 616, 641, 600, 530 (4th ser. 1837) (noting
the resolutions of Prince George, Culpepper, Hanover, Princess Anne, Fairfax, and Nasemond
Counties in Virginia). Nasemond County resolved that the "African trade is injurious to this Colony, obstructs the population of it by freemen, prevents manufacturers and other useful ermigrants from Europe from settling among us, and occasions an annual increase of the balance of
trade against this colony." Id. at 530 (emphasis in original).
66. See W. DuBois, supra note 61, at 50; D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 58, at 19; see also
infra text accompanying notes 140-42. Whether this view was reasonable or wishful thinking is
questionable. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 81, 86-90 (1972).
67. See H. APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS (1983); cf. Cottrol & Diamond, Book
Review, 56 TuL. L. REV. 1107, 1110-1112 (1982) (reviewing A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978)) (discussing the
concerns over slavery and security in the Northern States).
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each state had received the same number of votes in Congress. 8 Many
representatives, especially those of the large states, perceived a need to
rectify this matter. On the third day of the Convention, when Virginia's
Governor Edmund Randolph proposed as part of the "Virginia Plan" 9
that representation in the new Congress be divided not equally among
states, but instead be proportioned on the basis of population, ° controversy over the question of slavery was inevitable. Despite all the conflict
it produced between large and small states, Randolph's proposal was
not unreasonable. By introducing population as the basis of voting
power, however, Randolph had broached the subject of whether and
how to count the slave population. Randolph's proposal provided that
votes in Congress be apportioned according to either "the number of
free inhabitants" or "the Quotas of contribution," whichever was
deemed more appropriate under the circumstances. 7 1 By "Quotas of
contribution" Randolph meant to grant representation for interests in
72
slaves.
The slavery issue casts a peculiar light on the Convention's representation debate. Popular historical mythology teaches that small states
favored equal representation and large states favored proportional rep-

resentation. This statement is only partially true and is misleading in
its simplicity. The three most populous states, Virginia, Pennsylvania,
and Massachusetts, were staunch supporters of proportional representation. Three of the smallest states, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware, fought vigorously for equal representation. Yet the relatively
unpopulous states of South Carolina and Georgia provided staunch, un68. See, e.g., 1 W. BENTON, 1787: DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION 104, 149 (1986) (remarks of
James Wilson of Pennsylvania); id. at 114 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton of New York); id. at
124-25 (remarks of James Madison of Virginia); id. at 141 (remarks of William Pierce of Georgia);
id. at 141-42 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts). This position was not unanimous and
was generally at odds with the position of smaller states. See, e.g., id. at 134 (remarks of Roger
Sherman of Connecticut).
69. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-22 (1911); see also
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 953-63 (C.
Tansill comp. 1927).
70. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 20.

71. Id.
72. The term "Quotas of contribution" finds its genesis in the attempts of the Continental
Congress to overcome the limitations of Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation, which had
designated the value of land as the measure of the contribution each state would make to the
payment of the national government's expenses. This method of apportionment had been inadequate, and Congress had fastened upon a more workable, more ascertainable formula by basing the
apportionment of revenues on population. Slaves were counted under this formula by adding
three-fifths of their number to make the "proportion" or "quota" that each state was expected to
contribute. Thus, in proposing to base representation on quotas of contribution, Randolph was
proposing to base representation in part on the slave population. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 41, 230, 258 (1922); 25 id. at 637-38, 951-52; 30 id. at 102-08
(1924); see also infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
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wavering support for proportional representation, while the relatively
populous state of New York was steadfast in favor of equal representation.7" Virginia's James Madison described the stark conflict among the
states concerning slavery and representation: "[T]he States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by
other circumstances. . . principally from [the effects of] their having or
not having slaves. 7' 4 The great division in the young United States did
not lie between large and small states, in Madison's view, but between
those of the North and those of the South, and the difference arose over
slavery.75 Equal representation meant that the eight states above the
Mason-Dixon line would hold sway over the five below it. For the union
of states to succeed, however, the North would have to give the South
"defensive power" to protect slavery.76 In Madison's view, equal representation would not accomplish this goal."
Even while Southerners in western Virginia and in Franklin (western North Carolina) were agitating for statehood, 8 the delegates in
Philadelphia were aware that the people of Maine were instigating a
separation from Massachusetts, 9 that Vermont would soon be a state,8 0
and that Congress under the Articles of Confederation had designated
as many as five new free states to be carved out of the Northwest Territory."1 Equality of representation reasonably could be anticipated to
73.
D.

S.

174, 204 (1967);
1765-1820, at 177-78 (1971).

LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRucTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS,

74. 1 M.

FARRAND, supra note 69, at 486.
75. Madison thought it "pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lay, not
between the large & small but between the N. & Southn. States. The institution of slavery & its
consequences formed the line of discrimination." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 10; see also 1 id.
at 486 (remarks of James Madison); 2 id. at 450 (remarks of Charles Pinckney of South Carolina);
1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 371 (remarks of Rufus King of Massachusetts, who was "fully
convinced that the question concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto
been discussed, between the great and small States; but between the Southern and Eastern").
76. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 486.
77. Id.; see also 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 371-72.
78. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 455 (remarks of Luther Martin of Maryland); see
also S. EASLEY, HISTORY OF TENNESSEE 189-98 (1887 & reprint 1979); S.FOLMSBEE, R CORLEW, & E.
MITCHEL, TENNESSEE, A SHORT HISTORY 79-97 (1969).
79. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 363.
80. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 455 (remarks of Luther Martin).
81. Act of July 13, 1787 (the Northwest Ordinance), art. V, reprintedin 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 39, 48-49 (C. Carter ed. 1934) [hereinafter TERRITORIAL PAPERS]; see
also 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 541 (remarks of Rufus King). The Constitution was adopted
by the Convention on September 17, 1787. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 641, 665. The Northwest Ordinance was adopted by the Continental Congress on July 13, 1787, two months earlier.
Additionally, although the Philadelphia convention was conducted in secret, several delegates to
the Constitutional Convention were also representatives in Congress, and a number carried tales
back and forth from Philadelphia to New York, Congress's seat at the time. Thus, the provisions of
the Northwest Ordinance, even while being debated in Congress, had an effect upon the Convention. S. LYND, supra note 73, at 187-89; see, e.g., 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 363-64. It would
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mean perpetual preponderance of Northern, nonslaveholding power.2"
By contrast, proportional representation meant relative advantage
to the South for two reasons. First, with five of thirteen votes in the
Confederation's Congress, the South held only 38.5 percent of congressional power. Under a plan of proportional representation that included
the slave population on the same basis as the free population, the South
would hold 49.9 percent of congressional power. Even if no representation were given for the slave population, an unlikely result, the South,
with 41 percent of the free population, would experience a net gain of
2.5 percent over the equality of representation scheme.83 Thus, any plan
of proportional representation would produce a net gain for the South.
Once it was decided that representation in one house of the new Congress would be proportioned according to population, the only real
question was how large that gain would be.
The second reason that proportional representation meant an advantage for the South was that the delegates to the Convention expected population to expand at a greater rate in the South than in the
North. Pennsylvania's Gouverneur Morris feared that a majority of the
Nation's population would soon live in North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia. 4 South Carolina's Pierce Butler dismissed that fear as a
misapprehension of a trend that Butler saw-that "[t]he people and
strength of America are evidently bearing Southwardly and South westbe a mistake, however, to presume that the Northwest Ordinance implied that the Philadelphia
convention or the Southern States believed that slavery was doomed never to expand beyond the
states in which it existed in 1787. By its terms, the Northwest Ordinance applied only to territories
north of the Ohio River, which included western lands already ceded by New York, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Virginia, 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra, at 3, 6, 10-22, but not those lands belonging to North Carolina, South Carolina, or Georgia. Of this latter group, North Carolina in 1789 and
Georgia in 1802 specifically reserved rights to slavery in the lands they ceded, even though they
adopted the remainder of the Northwest Ordinance as the territories' governing instrument. 4
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra, at 3, 7; 5 id. at 142, 145. Given South Carolina's strong proslavery
concerns at both the Philadelphia convention and the ratifying convention that followed, its act of
cession, which was passed less than one month after the Northwest Ordinance and which did not
mention slavery at all, indicates that South Carolina was not apprehensive about the future of
slavery south of the Ohio River. Act of Aug. 24, 1787, 5 S.C. Stats. at Large 1346, at 4 (Cooper
1936). The argument that the Southern States had no power to limit the authority of the federal
government respecting slavery in the territories does not acknowledge that the lower South was
under no obligation to cede its lands to the federal government. If it had been deemed impossible
to limit the federal government's authority to prohibit slavery in the territories, the lower South
simply would not have ceded its lands, and what became population growth in new Southern
States simply would have been population growth in the original Southern States. This result
would have made no difference to the political power of the South in the House of Representatives
or to the political interests of the South as a region.
82. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 9-10 (remarks of James Madison).
83. See D. ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 179-80.
84. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 394.
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wardly. ' ' s5 Madison observed that "the people are constantly swarming
from the more to the less populous places-from Europe to [America]
from the Northn. & middle parts of the U.S. to the Southern & Western. They go where land is cheaper, because labour is dearer." ' This
shift of population made it reasonable to expect that the South eventually would hold a majority of the population. Thus, proportional representation meant a plan under which many anticipated that as the
South's population grew relative to that of the North, the South's influence and its power to protect slavery also would grow. 7
Hence arose the impetus for what has become known as the threefifths compromise, embodied in article I, section 2, clause 3 of the
Constitution:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other Persons. 8

The "other Persons" referred to were slaves.8

9

Southerners at the Con-

85. Id.
86. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 585-86.
87. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 10. Madison explained that if a plan of proportional
representation were adopted, "the N. Side would still outnumber the other: but not in the same
degree, at this time; and every day would tend towards an equilibrium." Id.; see also 1 W. BENTON,
supra note 68, at 394 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris and Pierce Butler). For Rufus King, the
expected population shift was a reason for the North to be scrupulously fair in dealing with the
Southern States on the issue of representation:
He was far from wishing to retain any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the Republic.
If justice was not the basis of the connection it could not be of long duration. He must be
shortsighted indeed who does not foresee that whenever the Southern States shall be more
numerous that the Northern, they can and will hold a language that will awe them into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case injury shall be done them, will their threats be
less urgent or effectual, when force shall back their demands.
Id. at 389.
88. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
89. Antislavery crusaders later argued that this indirect reference to slaves, along with the
others in the Constitution (both in Article I, § 9, clause 1 and in Article IV, § 2, clause 3 slaves are
not referred to by name but instead as "Persons"), was an indication that the Constitution was an
antislavery document. See, e.g., 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 226-27 (J. Blassingame ed.
1979) (remarks of Samuel R. Ward, Jan. 17, 1850) [hereinafter DOUGLASS PAPERS]; see also 3 id. at
385-86 (Douglass' address entitled What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? (July 5, 1852)); 3 id. at
151-62 (remarks during a debate on whether the Constitution is antislavery in intent (May 20-21,
1857)); id. at 163, 181-83 (address on the Dred Scott decision (May 14, 1857)); E. FONER, FREE SoIL,
FREE LABOR,FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102
(1970). Antislavery forces were far from unanimous on this position. See, e.g., W. PHILLIPS, THE
CONSTITUTION A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT (1856); see also W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA,

1760-1848, at 229-48 (1977). Even Douglass at one time had ar-

gued that the Constitution was a proslavery document. See 2 DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra, at 231-32
(remarks of Frederick Douglass (Jan. 17, 1850)).
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vention wanted to count slaves on the same basis as free persons.90 This
method of counting slaves would have given the South a clear advantage, for the overwhelming majority of slaves were held in the South."'
By contrast, Northern delegates did not wish to count slaves at all;92
the relative advantage in this position was with the North." No representation for the slave population, however, might have forced the
South out of the Union; equal representation for the slave population
might have brought the same result for the North. A compromise was
necessary."
90. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 364. For South Carolina's Charles Pinckney (to be
distinguished from his cousin and fellow South Carolina delegate Charles Cotesworth Pinckney),
"[t]he number of inhabitants appeared ...the only just and practicable rule. He thought the
blacks ought to stand on equality with the whites." Id. Pinckney's colleagues from the state,
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Pierce Butler, agreed strenuously. See id. at 378, 386, 389. All
members of the Southern delegation, however, did not hold this position. In response to a motion
by Pierce Butler and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina-that slaves be weighted
equally with, as opposed to three-fifths of, free persons in any rule of representation-Virginia's
George Mason argued that despite the tremendous economic value of slaves, he "could not however regard them as equal to freemen and could not vote for them as such." Id. at 379. When
Butler and Pinckney's motion came to a vote, only South Carolina and Georgia voted in favor;
Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia voted against it. Id. This vote occurred after considerable
discussion, debate, and compromise, and undoubtedly was anticipated even by the South Carolinians. As part of the "South Carolina Plan," like Randolph's Virginia Plan introduced on the third
day of the Convention, Charles Pinckney proposed that one house of the federal legislature be
apportioned in accordance with population, "3/5 of Blacks included." Sketch of Pinckney's Plan
for a Constitution, 1787, 9 AM. HIST. REv. 735, 742 (1904).
91. The 1790 census reveals that of the Nation's 698,000 slaves, 649,000, or 93% were held in
the five most Southern States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL VIEw, 17901978, at 11-12 (1979).
92. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 299-300 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts); id. at 368 (remarks of William Patterson of New Jersey); id. at 379, 385-87 (remarks of
Gouverneur Morris); id. at 383-84 (remarks of Rufus King). This position was not unanimous,
however. Regarding representation, William Johnson of Connecticut believed that "the number of
people ought to be established as the rule, and that all descriptions including blacks equally with
whites, ought to fall within the computation," the issue of slavery notwithstanding. Id. at 387.
93. To be sure, politics was not the sole reason for desiring not to count slaves at all. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts opined that slaves ought not be recognized as equal to freemen
when as property slaves were on the same level as horses and cattle. Id. at 296-97. Gouverneur
Morris believed that representation for interests in slaves would be "doing injustice to. . .human
nature," and would give encouragement to the slave trade. Id. at 385.
94. Rufus King feared that any representation for interests in slaves "would excite great discontents among the States having no slaves." Id. at 383. North Carolina's William Davie was "sure
that North Carolina would never confederate on any terms that did not rate them [slaves] at least
3/5. If the Eastern States meant therefore to exclude them altogether the business was at an end."
Id. at 387. Gouverneur Morris warned: "[Ilt is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what the
Southern States will never agree to. It is equally vain for the latter to require what other States
can never admit"; he believed that his own Pennsylvania would "never agree to a representation of
Negroes." Id. Rufus King was correct in predicting that representation for interests in slaves would
be a point of objection for nonslaveholding states in the North. See, e.g., Brutus, Essay III, N.Y.
Journal, Nov. 15, 1787, reprintedin THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 269, 270-71 (W. Allen & G.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:93

The resolution of this issue was suggested by Randolph's proposal
that under certain circumstances representation would be based on
"Quotas of contribution" or wealth. One view, not exclusive to either
Northern or Southern delegates, held that government is instituted to
protect property and to encourage wealth. 5 Under this proposition,
which embodies the views of John Locke,9 6 wealth and property, as "the
Main object[s] of Gov[ernmen]t," 9 "the principal object[s] of Society,"98 and the "great means of carrying . . . [government] on," 9
should be the measures of power as well. The delegates holding this
view believed that "money was power. . . and. . . the states ought to
have weight in the Gov[ernmen]t-in proportion to their wealth." 10 0
One method by which to measure wealth was to measure population, for a state produced wealth through its labor force. While all free
labor was presumed to be equally efficient, that same presumption of
equality did not obtain with respect to slave labor. The Continental
Congress had agreed in 1783, in an attempt to apportion tax burdens,
that the value of a slave's labor was to be measured at three-fifths the
value of a free person's. 101 Though this ratio had never been applied
under the Articles of Confederation, it provided a familiar refuge for
those seeking to calculate the efficiency of slave labor.
Certain Southern delegates urged at the Constitutional Convention
that slaves and whites were equally efficient laborers, and thus that the
weight of slave representation in Congress should be equal to that of
whites. 0 21 Others, such as Virginia's George Mason, "could not regard
Lloyd eds. 1985); see also 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILA-

DELPHIA, IN 1787, at 227-28 (1888) (remarks at the New York ratifying convention by Melancton
Smith, who, finding the idea of slave representation "utterly repugnant," argued against the threefifths clause). But see 2 id. at 39 (remarks at the Massachusetts ratifying convention by Samuel
Nasson, who complained about the tax question embodied in the three-fifths clause and remarked
that "this state will pay as great a tax for three children in the cradle, as any of the Southern
States will for five hearty working negro men").
95. See 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 533. Gouverneur Morris put the case as well as
anyone at the Convention: "The savage State was more favorable to liberty than was the Civilized;
and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by allmen who had not acquired a taste for property
. . .which could only be secured by the restraints of regular Government." Id.
96. See, e.g., J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1884); see also D. ROBINSON, supra
note 73, at 184-85.
97. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 533 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris).
98. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 358 (remarks of John Rutledge).
99. Id. at 364 (remarks of Pierce Butler).
100. 1 M FARRAND, supra note 69, at 196 (remarks of John Rutledge).
101. See supra note 72.
102. See I W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 389. Charles Pinckney argued that equality of representation was "nothing more than justice. The blacks are the labourers, the peasants of the Southern States: they are as productive of pecuniary resources as those of the Northern States. They
add equally to the wealth, . . . to the strength of the nation." Id.; see also id. at 378 (remarks of
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[slaves] as equal to freemen and could not vote for them as
such." 103 North Carolina's Hugh Williamson agreed with the recollection of Nathanial Gorham of Massachusetts, "that if the Southern
States contended for the inferiority of blacks to whites when taxation
was in view, the Eastern States on the same occasion contended for
...

their equality.' 10 4 Williamson, however, concurred in neither extreme,
but instead "approved of the ratio of 3/5. ''105 In the end, only South

Carolina and Georgia voted in favor of equality of representation for
interests in slaves, 06 and the three-fifths compromise was enshrined in
the Constitution.
While it is important to note what the compromise tragically implied for the future of the Nation, equally noteworthy is what the compromise did not mean. The compromise did not mean that blacks or
slaves were only three-fifths human. For one thing, the census counted
a free black as a whole person, just like a free white. For another, the
humanity of blacks was not among the many questions and points of
controversy discussed and resolved, or even left unresolved, at the Convention. The three-fifths compromise was based mainly on the issues of
whether and to what degree the South would be advantaged in Congress by its wealth in slaves; in some smaller measure the compromise
was based on the degree to which the South would be taxed on that
wealth. The compromise resolving those questions represented the calculation that slave labor was less efficient than free labor-that five
10 7
slaves produced as much wealth as only three free persons.
Thus, the Framers should not be criticized for having agreed to
count the slave as a fraction of a free person. To engage in such criticism would logically require one to praise the Southern delegates for
wanting to count the slave as a whole person, and, by the same reasoning, to redouble criticism of the Northern delegates for arguing at first
that slaves should not be counted at all. The Southern position-that
slaves would be governed by whites and would contribute their number
to the determination of white power in a government in which the
slaves themselves would have no voice-was the more racist position.
Compromise with the North mollified this extreme position and gave
Pierce Butler).
103. Id. at 379.
104. Id. Gorham recalled that Southern delegates to the Continental Congress had argued
previously that slave labor was inferior to free labor by a factor greater than what had been decided upon. Gorham announced that "[t]he arguments on the former occasion had convinced him
that 3/5 was pretty near the just proportion and [that] he should vote according to the same
opinion now." Id. at 378; see also D. ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 157 n.
105. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 379.
106. Id. On a previous vote, Delaware had joined the two deep South states. Id.
107. See D. ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 156-57, 188.
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the South some advantage in Congress, but not the complete advantage
that the South had sought.
None of these explanations, however, deflects Justice Marshall's
fundamental criticism of the Framers for having agreed to the threefifths compromise. Justice Marshall's criticism is especially appropriate
if the implications of Chief Justice Taney's dictum in Scott v. Sandford
are correct: that blacks were not considered to be and could never become citizens of the United States, and that in effect the government
under the Constitution was of whites, by whites, and for whites only."'8
Even more damning of the Framers' efforts, however, is that the threefifths compromise represented the expectation of a major cession of federal political power to the Southern States, whose prime interests included the protection of slavery.
Moreover, the delegates to the Convention were aware that the
overrepresentation of the South in determining the course of federal
power was itself an incentive for the South to keep slavery intact.10 '
Even if slavery became only a marginally feasible economic institution,
the maintenance of slavery would help to maintain the South's political
power. Although some might argue that the South's interest in maintaining congressional power might have led the South to free its slaves,
108. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1857). In effect, Chief Justice Taney maintained that blacks, regardless of their status as free or slave, were mere inhabitants
of the United States, never to be citizens, id. at 418-19, even if a state independently granted them
citizenship, id. at 405-06. In reaching his conclusion, Chief Justice Taney gave emphasis to the
mass of discriminatory state legislation and constitutional law limiting the rights of free blacks. Id.
at 412-16; see also L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860
(1961). Chief Justice Taney ignored or otherwise deliberately dismissed a body of politically and
physically liberating legislative and constitutional law that both free and slave states had adopted
in the wake of the American Revolution-law that had cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the point
that the Chief Justice was making. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 564, 572-76 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting); see also Diamond & Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification
Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L. REv. 255, 260-62 (1983). The citizenship vel
non of free blacks under the 1787 Constitution as unamended is not the subject and is beyond the
scope of this Article. Yet, it must be pointed out that Chief Justice Taney's opinion regarding the
citizenship of blacks was not shared by a majority of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taney's
opinion was styled "the opinion of the court," Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399, but it was
joined in full only by Justice Wayne, who saw fit to write his own opinion nonetheless. Id. at 454.
Justice Daniel wrote his own opinion and did not join at all in the Taney opinion, but agreed with
the Chief Justice on a point for point basis. Id. at 469. Four Justices, Grier, Nelson, Campbell, and
Catron, agreed with the result as announced by Chief Justice Taney, but did not reach the issue of
citizenship. Id. at 457 (Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring); id. at 494 (Campbell, J. concurring); id. at 519 (Catron, J., concurring). Two Justices, McLean and Curtis, dissented
with respect to both the result and the issue of citizenship. Id. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting); id.
at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Thus, only three members of the Court had declared that blacks
were outside the Constitution because of their race, and two members had dissented vigorously.
This alignment hardly constituted a firm national consensus on this issue.
109. See I M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 561 (remarks of William Patterson); 2 id. at 222
(remarks of Gouverneur Morris).
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deny them the vote, and count their whole number instead of threefifths toward representation, this argument is flawed. The South could
not have risked freeing its slaves, because freed slaves would have been
able to vote with their feet-to leave the South for Northern lands,
where their numbers would redound to the benefit of Northern States
and to the detriment of the South.
Nor should criticism on this point be mollified by the provision in
the three-fifths clause that direct taxes would be apportioned in the
same manner as representation in the House of Representatives. Even
at the Convention the delegates did not expect that the power to levy
direct taxes would amount to much. When Rufus King of Massachusetts expounded on what was planned for the new government's powers
of taxation, he spoke not of direct taxes, but stated that indirect taxation was to be substituted for the tax power of the Continental Congress.110 Madison had the same expectation. He reported that, "it
seemed to be understood on all hands" that "future contributions...
would be principally levied on imports and exports." ' ' Moreover, the
Convention certainly had been warned by Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania: "Let it not be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned
to representation. It is idle to suppose that the Gen[era]l Gov[ernmen]t
can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people scattered
over so vast a Country.""' 2 As a result, the potential liability to the
South under the three-fifths clause was likely to be small, if any."'
110. 2 id. at 6. Later, Rufus King stated that he had been correct in his appraisal of likely
taxation sources. In a letter dated November 4, 1803, he wrote:
Had it been forseen that we could raise revenue to the extent we have done, from indirect
taxes, the Representation of Slaves wd. never have been admitted; but going upon the maxim
that taxation and Representation are inseparable, and that the Genl. Govt. must resort to
direct taxes, the States in which Slavery does not exist, were injudiciously led to concede to
this unreasonable provision of the Constitution.
3 id. at 400.
111. 1 Id. at 585.
112. 2 id. at 223.
113. See THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 143-44 (A. Hamilton) (H. Jones ed. 1961). New York's
Alexander Hamilton was not sanguine about the prospect of raising revenue under any system of
direct taxation:
It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience
we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by
direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection
have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the
treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular system of administration inherent
in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a
languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive
collections, and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
Id. Most Southerners were unconcerned about the possibility of direct taxes. Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, possibly the staunchest of slavery's defenders at the Philadelphia convention, argued to
the ratifying convention in South Carolina, "I did not expect that we had conceded too much to
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B. Importation of Slaves and the 1808 Clause
An understanding of the Framers' expectations of population expansion and their intentions concerning Southern influence over the
House of Representatives is critical to a proper interpretation of the
Convention's treatment of the African slave trade. The provisions to
which the Convention agreed are known as the 1808 clause:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.11

The provisions of the 1808 clause impliedly recognized the inherent
ability of Congress, under the commerce clause if no other provision, to
outlaw the importation of slaves into the Nation. 115 It is important,
however, to understand that the 1808 clause was not a grant of power to
Congress, but a limitation on Congress's power. The 1808 clause demanded nothing from Congress. Instead, the clause merely prevented
Congress from acting to prohibit the African slave trade for a period of
twenty years.
The ratifying conventions of Southern States evinced mixed reactions to the provisions of the 1808 clause, because the upper and lower
Southern States had different interests concerning the importation of
slaves. South Carolina and Georgia were lightly populated and considered their strength to be southerly population expansion; 16 they considered the slave population to be their wealth, "[their] only natural
resource." 117 One South Carolinian at the ratifying convention opined
the Eastern States, when they allowed us a representation for a species of property which they
have not among them." 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 283. He boasted further that "we have made
the best terms for the security of this species of property [slaves] it was in our power to make." Id.
at 286. Edward Rutledge, Pinckney's colleague at the South Carolina convention and the Governor
of the State, insisted that provisions in the Constitution relating to direct taxes worked to the
advantage of the South: "All the free people (and there are few others) in the Northern States are
to be taxed by the new Constitution; whereas only the free people, and two fifths [sic] of the
slaves, in the Southern States, are to be rated, in the apportioning of taxes." Id. at 277. For this
reason, George Nicholas, speaking at the Virginia convention, said that the three-fifths clause "is a
great security." 3 id. at 457. Also at the Virginia convention, Governor Randolph was able to ask
rhetorically: "Where is the part [of the Constitution] that has a tendency to the abolition of slavery?" Id. at 598 (emphasis in original). Compare id. at 457, 458 (remarks of George Mason and
Patrick Henry at the Virginia convention) with id. at 458-59 (James Madison's response).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
115. Those favoring a federal government with limited power were greatly concerned by the
1808 clause and its implications for Congress' implied powers under the commerce clause. See 3 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 454-56 (remarks of Mr. John Tyler and Patrick Henry at the Virginia
ratifying convention).
116. See 4 id. at 283 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney at the South Carolina ratifying convention).
117. Id. at 273 (remarks of Rawlins Lowndes at the South Carolina ratifying convention).
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115

that "[w]ithout negroes, this state would degenerate into one of the
most contemptible in the Union. ' 118 But Maryland and Virginia already
had prohibited the importation of slaves, 1 9 and North Carolina had
levied an importation tax.12 0 For each of these states a large percentage
of slaves represented a domestic security risk.' 2 1 Moreover, Virginia was
This belief on the part of South Carolinians originated many years prior. A colonist in 1682 wrote:
a rational man will certainly inquire, when I have land, what shall I doe [sic] with it? What
commoditys [sic] shall I be able to produce that will yield me the money in other countrys
[sic] that I may be inabled [sic] to buy Negro slaves (without which a Planter can never do
any great matter) and purchase other things for my pleasure and convenience, that Carolina
doth not produce.
A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 162-63 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wilson, An Account of

the Province of Carolina, in

NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA,

1650-1708, at 174 (A. Salley ed.

1911)).
118. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 272 (remarks of Rawlins Lowndes).
119. 1 Md. Laws ch. 23 (Kilty 1783); see also Act 1 (1778), reprintedin 9 Va. Stats. at Large
471 (Hening 1823); Act 33 (1780), reprintedin 10 id. at 307 (allowing relief for South Carolina and
Georgia war refugees); Act 77 (1785), reprinted in 12 id. at 182.
120. 1 N.C. Acts of Assembly 413, 492 (Martin 1780).
121. See Anderson, Rowley & Tollison, Rent Seeking and the Restriction of Human Exchange, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 87 n.10 (1988). Exact figures for the population in 1787 are unclear.
See generally F. DEXTER, ESTIMATES OF POPULATION IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES (1887). According
to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the figures for the Southern States on which the Philadelphia
convention based the initial apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives were as
follows:
State
Maryland
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

Population
(thousands)

Slaves
(thousands)

Slave %

250
532
224
182
98

80
280
60
80
20

32
53
27
44
20

4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 282. At the Virginia ratifying convention, Governor Randolph estimated the population figures for Virginia differently, with 236,000 slaves and 352,000 whites. 3 id.
at 73. Three years later, the first decennial census emerged with these presumably more accurate
figures for the original Southern States:
State
Maryland
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

Population
(thousands)

Slaves
(thousands)

Slave %

320
748
394
249
83

103
293
101
107
29

32
39
26
43
35

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NEGRO POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1790-1915, at 57 (1968); 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 29, 36, 32, 34, 26 (1975) [hereinafter
HISTORICAL STATISTICS]. Regardless of the actual count, it is clear that Southerners thought that a

large slave population represented vulnerability. Governor Randolph asked his colleagues at the
ratifying convention:
Are we not weakened by the population whom we hold in slavery? The day may come when
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considered an exporter of slaves and thus would benefit from the cessa122
tion of slave imports.

Thus, delegates to conventions in the upper South complained that
the new Constitution would continue for twenty years an "abominable
traffic"12 and "nefarious trade, 124 which was "diabolical in itself, and
disgraceful to mankind. 1 2 5 Yet, these delegates also were concerned

that the Constitution had not provided greater security for the South's
interests in the slaves already present in the United States. 12 6 This conflict between concerns of morality and of self-interest was explained at
the Virginia convention by George Mason: "[T]he continuation of this
detestable trade adds daily to our weakness ... [Thus] [i]t is far from
being a desirable property; but it will involve us in great difficulties and
infelicity to be now deprived of them..
27
bring ruin on a great many people."'1

..

and the loss of which would

Delegates to the ratifying convention in South Carolina, a lower
South State, had a more straightforward and internally consistent reaction to the 1808 clause. Rawlins Lowndes noted the importance of
slaves to the South Carolina economy and bitterly lamented the possible exclusion of slaves twenty years hence: "[B]ehold how our kind
friends in the north were determined soon to tie up our hands, and
drain us of what we had!'

28

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney stated both

his opposition to a prohibition on slave imports and his view on the
importance of a continuing influx of slaves:
I am of the same opinion now as I was two years ago, when I used the expressions
the gentleman has quoted-that, while there remained one acre of swamp-land uncleared of South Carolina, I would raise my voice against restricting the importation of negroes. I am as thoroughly convinced as that gentleman is, that the nature
of our climate, and the flat, swampy situation of our country, obliges us to cultivate
our lands with negroes, and that without them South Carolina would soon be a
they may make an impression upon us. Gentlemen who have been long accustomed to the
contemplation of the subject, think there is a cause of alarm in this case .... Our negroes
are so numerous, and are daily becoming so. When I reflect on their comparative number, and
comparative condition, I am more persuaded of the great fitness of becoming more formidable
than ever.
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 73, 192. Fear of slave rebellion plagued slaveholders in the United
States from colonial times to the Civil War, see generally H. APTHEKER, supra note 67, at 18-52,
162-208: the more slaves in a society, the more a society had to fear. Cottrol & Diamond, supra
note 67, at 1110-12.
122. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 949.
123. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 101 (remarks of James Galloway of North Carolina).
124.

3 id. at 269 (remarks of George Mason).

125. Id. at 452 (remarks of George Mason).
126. See, e.g., id. at 270, 452-53 (remarks of George Mason); id. at 101 (remarks of James
Galloway).
127. 3 id. at 269-70.
128. 4 id. at 273.
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desert waste.12

Delegates to the ratifying conventions of the Northern States were
equally straightforward, but, in opposition to the views emerging from
the deep South, expressed their antipathy for the African slave trade.
13 0
According to the Northern delegates, it was a "reproachful trade"
and a "wicked practice." 131 Joshua Atherton of New Hampshire complained that by accepting the 1808 clause "we become consenters to,
and partakers in, the sin and guilt of this abominable traffic, at least
for a certain period, without any positive stipulation that it should even
be brought to an end."'13 2 Yet, by approving the Constitution, Northern
ratifying conventions, like their counterparts in other states, approved
the 1808 clause. They did so based on an understanding that the 1808
clause was the result of compromise. At the Philadelphia convention
the delegates had been aware that for South Carolina and Georgia the
importation of slaves was a question on which union might turn. 13 3 Delegates from Connecticut were willing to accede to the Southern demand
on this point,134 and delegates from Massachusetts were conspicuously
silent on the 1808 question. Others from the Northern and Mid-Atlantic States opposed unlimited importation. They argued that importation of slaves not only added to the threat of slave insurrection, 13 but
129. Id. at 285.
130. 2 id. at 452 (remarks of William Wilson of Pennsylvania).
131. Id. at 149 (remarks of Isaac Backus of Massachusetts).
132. Id. at 203 (emphasis in original).
133. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 947 (remarks of Charles Pinckney); id. at 952 (remarks of Edmund Randolph).
134. Id. at 948. Roger Sherman wanted "to have as few objections as possible to the proposed
scheme of Government," and he thought it probable that the import trade would be outlawed by
the states in due time. Id.; see also id. at 942, 952 (additional remarks by Sherman). Oliver Ellsworth was more crass about the matter. Sherman at least had averred that he "regarded the slave
trade as iniquitous," id. at 942, but Ellsworth declared, "Let every State import what it pleases.
The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States themselves. What
enriches a part enriches the whole, and the States are the best judges of their particular interest."
Id. at 946. William Johnson, the third member of Connecticut's delegation, did not speak on this
subject, but during the prior debate on representation Johnson had been heard to support the
South's initial position in favor of full representation for its slave population. Id. at 387.
135. See id. at 941-42 (remarks of Rufus King); id. at 943 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris);
id. at 946 (remarks of Luther Martin). Luther Martin later reported to the Maryland legislature on
the Convention debate concerning the issue of slavery and domestic security:
It was further urged that, by this system of government, every State is to be protected both
from foreign invasion and from domestic insurrections;that, from this consideration, it was
of the utmost importance it should have a power to restrain the importation of slaves; since
in proportion as the number of slaves are increased in any State, in the same proportion the
State is weakened, and exposed to foreign invasion or domestic insurrection, and by so much
less will it be able to protect itself against either. ...
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 212 (emphasis in original). Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he United States . . .shall protect each [state] . . . against Invasion; and
...against domestic Violence." U.S. CONsT. art IV, § 4.
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also repudiated the ideology of the Revolution,3 6 induced moral failure,137 and caused economic stagnation.13'8 The Convention faced a dilemma on the importation question: To risk either that "two States
might be lost to the Union," or that strong antislavery elements in free
13 9
states might be alienated.

Those who opposed and those who favored slave importation both
thought that they had something to gain by the compromise embodied
in the 1808 clause. Some of those who opposed the trade believed that a
halt to the slave trade twenty years hence might "totally annihilate the
slave trade"' 4 0-that within the "lapse of a few years,

. .

. Congress will

have power to exterminate slavery from within our borders. '14' This
view resulted from a misreading of the 1808 clause: the clause did not
establish the power of Congress to abolish slavery; the clause merely
limited the exercise of congressional power to abolish the import trade
in slaves. Nonetheless, the 1808 clause caused considerable optimism
among Northerners who thought that "although slavery is not smitten
by an apoplexy, yet it has received a mortal wound, and will die of a
'142
consumption.

Those Southerners in favor of the international slave trade knew
better than to fear the death of slavery from a lack of foreign replacements. For all the hyperbolic racket South Carolina's ratifying convention raised about the state's economy and its need for foreign sources of
slaves, South Carolina's leaders had seen slavery survive quite well during and after the Revolution, 143 and they knew of Virginia's surplus of

slaves.4 For all their unhappiness with the 1808 clause, South Carolina's leaders agreed to the clause and to the Constitution as a whole for
the same simple reason as the states to the north: The compromises on
the 1808 clause and the Constitution allowed the Union to continue,
and with union there was strength.
The deep South, however, had another reason for agreeing to postpone the day of reckoning on foreign slave trade until 1808. Delegates
to the deep South ratifying conventions, like those delegates at the
Convention in Philadelphia, expected population to increase rapidly to136. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 946 (remarks of Luther Martin).
137. Id. at 948-49 (remarks of George Mason).
138. Id. at 948.
139. Id. at 952 (remarks of Edward Randolph).
140. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 107 (remarks of General Thompson of Massachusetts).
141. Id. at 484 (remarks of William Wilson of Pennsylvania). North Carolina's James Galloway similarly apprehended that the intentions of compromisers who desired to halt the slave import trade within twenty years might lead to the end of slavery altogether. See 4 id. at 101.
142. 2 id. at 41 (remarks of Thomas Dawes of Massachusetts).
143. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 61, at 25.
144. See 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 285 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney).
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ward the South and Southwest. 145 By preventing Congress from banning the foreign slave trade until 1808, the deep South had delayed a
decision on the matter until a time when the deep South, together with
its allies, might have the votes to forestall a prohibition altogether. 146
This possibility casts a sinister light on the agreement that produced the 1808 clause. Four days after the Convention agreed to the
twenty-year extension for foreign slave traffic, the South carried out its
end of the bargain when the Convention decided the outcome of a proposal that acts of Congress regulating commerce would require a twothirds majority.147 This issue was perceived strictly as a sectional conflict, with the Northern States favoring a simple majority and the
Southern States favoring the wider majority. 48 Northern States wanted
freedom to defend their commercial interests against foreign interference. Southern States saw their interests in opposition to those of the
North and wanted protection from the Northern majority that would
exist for the short term in both houses of Congress. The vote at the
Convention went along geographic lines with one exception: Of the five
Southern States, South Carolina voted with the seven Northern States
in favor of a simple majority. 4 9 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney explained
South Carolina's position as follows: It was in the "true interest of the
S[outhern] States to have no regulation of commerce," but after considering the "liberal conduct" of the New England States toward the
South Carolina position on freedom to import slaves, South Carolina
felt that a simple majority vote on commercial regulation would
suffice. 1 0
What did Pinckney mean by "liberal conduct?" The day before the
final vote on the 1808 clause, the Convention had assigned the slave
importation question to a committee in order to resolve the conflict between the forces that opposed slavery and importation, and the states
145. Id. at 282 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney).
146. See W. DUBOIS, supra note 61, at 70-73. The positions of the states respecting foreign
importation of slaves did indeed change by 1808, but not in the direction South Carolina and
Georgia might have hoped at the time of the Convention. The successful revolt of the slaves in
Haiti in 1791 caused attitudes respecting slave importation to shift in the negative. Georgia forbade slave imports in 1798. South Carolina vacillated on the subject, alternately forbidding then
allowing the slave import trade from 1788 until 1803, when slave traffic was opened on a permanent basis pending the by then expected federal closure of the trade in 1808. North Carolina repealed its prohibitory tax in 1790, but in 1794 forbade the importation of slaves outright. Id.
147. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 449.
148. See id. at 449-53.
149. Id. at 453.
150. Id. at 449-50; see also id. at 451 (remarks of another South Carolinian, Pierce Butler,
who "considered the interests of [the Southern States] and of the Eastern States, to be as different
as the interests of Russia and Turkey," but who supported the simple majority because he was
"notwithstanding desirous of conciliating the affections of the East").
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of South Carolina and Georgia, who threatened secession. 151 The committee returned the following day with a proposal that the slave trade's
freedom from congressional limitation extend only to the year 1800.152
Pinckney then moved to substitute the year 1808, and this motion was
seconded by Nathanial Gorham of Massachusetts. 1' 3 Despite the notable dissent of James Madison, a wealthy slaveholder himself who protested this further extension as "dishonorable to the American
character,' 1

54

the motion passed with the votes of Massachusetts, New

Hampshire, and Connecticut
deciding the issue in favor of the South
155
Carolina proposal.

Thus, the New England States had traded their votes on a longer
period of protected slave importation in exchange for South Carolina's
vote on less restrictive commercial regulation. 1 56 This compromise is

omitted from the popular histories of the Constitutional Convention,
for it was an underhanded, "sleazy compromise,' ' 15 1 reeking of self-in-

terest and cynicism. The self-interest involved was not merely the selfevident concerns of Southern slaveholders, but also the more subtle
concerns of New England shipping interests, who stood to gain from
prolonged slave commerce with the South 158 and desired to regulate
151. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 952.
152. Id. at 953-54.
153. Id. at 954.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 449. Madison's notes on the Philadelphia convention belie any accusation of faulty inference. He reported: "An understanding on the two subjects
of navigation and slavery, had taken place between those two parts of the Union, which explains
the vote on the Motion depending, as well as the language of Genl, Pinckney and others." Id.
Moreover, in his report to the Maryland legislature, Luther Martin recounted the proceedings
within the committee that formulated for the Convention the original compromise on the issue of
slave imports:
This committee, of which I had the honor to be a member, met and took under their consideration the subjects committed to them. I found the eastern States, notwithstanding their aversion to slavery, were very willing to indulge the southern States, at least with a temporary
liberty to prosecute the slave-trade, provided the southern States would, in their turn, gratify
them, by laying no restrictionon navigation acts; and after a very little time the committee,
by a great majority, agreed on a report, by which the general government was to be prohibited
from preventing the importation of slaves for a limited time, and the restrictive clause relative to navigation acts was to be omitted.
3 id. at 210-11 (emphasis in original).
157. Id.; see P. Finkelman, Legal History and Constitutional Developments Post 1800, Remarks at the American Association of Law Librarians 80th Annual Meeting (July 7, 1987) (audiotape available through Mobiltape Company, Inc.). The term "sleazy compromise" is attributable
to Paul Finkelman, who has used it to describe the New England-South Carolina agreement.
158. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 949. During the debate on the 1808 clause, George
Mason recognized "that some of our Eastern brethren had from a lust of gain embarked on this
nefarious traffic." Id. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney appealed directly to the profit motive when he
reminded the Convention that "[t]he more slaves, the more produce to employ the carrying trade."

PRO-SLAVERY CONSTITUTION

1989]

commerce on the basis of a simple consensus, without the difficulty of
159
seeking a supermajority.
C.

The Fugitive Slave Clause and Taxation

The Constitution's third direct regulation of slavery is found in the
fugitive slave clause, article IV, section 2, clause 3:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.""0

The clause was based on article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, which
had forbidden slavery in the Northwest Territory, but concomitantly
had provided for the return of fugitive slaves from the territory. 6 ' Because the fugitive slave clause aroused virtually no debate at the Constitutional Convention, little can be divined about the Framers'
intent.'6 2 The fugitive slave clause was neither a major nor even a significant issue at the Constitutional Convention.
Of greater importance at the Convention was the issue of taxation,
a matter on which the Southern States held views different from, but
compatible with, their Northern sisters. The Convention emerged with
provisions that limited the taxing authority of both the federal and
Id. at 950. Some have argued that at this time New England shipping interests dealt little with
slave imports. See 2 W. WEEDEN, ECONOMIC AND SocIAL HIsToRY OF NEW ENGLAND, 1620-1789, at
834-36 (1890). Such commerce was at least a subject of social approbation and legal interdiction.
Id.; see also W. DuBois, supra note 61, at 29-38, 48-50. Yet, laws prohibiting participation in the
slave trade were difficult to enforce, and smuggling was considered "flagrant and widespread." D.
ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 318.
159. See generally 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 449-53. This desire was in New England's
interest only in the short term if sectional conflict was as real as the Convention perceived and if
the Convention's expectations for population growth were realized; for soon the Southern States,
whose interests were contrary to those of the North, would predominate in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, for this reason the simple majority represented a long-term benefit
to the South.
160. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
161. 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 81, at 39, 49.
162. The entire debate over the clause takes up less than two full pages of Farrand's Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787. Late in the Convention Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney
introduced a proposition "to require fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals."
2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 443. This proposal was too much even for the jaded sensibilities of
Connecticut's Roger Sherman, who had supported the deep South in its demand for a complete
prohibition on congressional power to ban slave imports. See supra note 134 and accompanying
text. Sherman declared that he saw "no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a
slave or servant, than a horse." 2 MKFARRAND, supra note 69, at 443. Butler then withdrew the
proposal, id., but returned the following day with a more gingerly worded proposal that passed
without objection. Id. at 453-54. The Convention's committee of style revised the clause yet another time, id. at 601-02, and so did the Convention as a whole, in deference to some who objected
that the committee's version had "favor[ed] the idea that slavery was legal in a moral view." Id. at
628.
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state governments. Article I, section 9, clause 5 provided simply: "No
Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."16' 3 Article I, section 10, clause 2 provided a similar prohibition against impositions of corresponding state taxes.' Charles Cotesworth Pinckney had
warned that South Carolina's agreement to the Constitution would be
in jeopardy if the Convention did not agree to protect against the taxation of exports. 65 Other Southern delegates echoed Pinckney's concerns.16 6 These delegates were concerned that taxation of exports might
be an instrument of sectional conflict and that, by taxing exports produced by the Southern States' slaves, the new government could in ef67
fect tax slavery.1
Northern delegates who disfavored the power of taxation over exports feared federal discrimination against certain states and potential
damage to the interests of particular states. These delegates saw an opportunity for consuming states to free themselves from unwelcome
taxes placed on goods by producer states'6 8 and banded with the South
to pass the two prohibitions. 69 Thus, the South's interest in protecting
slavery again was accommodated by Northern States who wished to satisfy their own selfish interests.
With the agreements that limited the power of Congress to disadvantage Southern interests in slavery, and especially with the compromise over representation embodied in the three-fifths clause, the South
had achieved through hard bargaining and joint effort a structural ad163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.5.
164. Article I, § 10, clause 2 declares:
No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for
the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
165. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 95.
166. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 973. George Mason hoped that "the Northern States
did not mean to deny the Southern this security." Id. North Carolina's Hugh Williamson and John
Francis Mercer, along with Daniel Carroll of Maryland, also spoke against export taxes. Id. at 97476. Pierce Butler declared "that he would never agree to the power of taxing exports." Id. at 984.
Southern delegates were nearly unanimous on the tax issue. Compare, however, the remarks of
James Madison, who wholeheartedly favored the power to levy taxes on exports. Id. at 974, 980-81.
Among Southern delegates, only George Washington joined Madison in this position. Id. at 982.
167. See id. at 981-82 (remarks of George Mason); id. at 958 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney). Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts shared the view that the taxing power over exports
"might be made use of to compel the States to comply with the will of the General Government."
Id. at 981.
168. See generally id. at 975-82.
169. Id. at 982. The five Southern States voted with Massachusetts and Connecticut to adopt
the federal prohibition. Id. Only Massachusetts and Maryland voted against prohibition on state
taxation of imports. Id. at 1086.
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vantage in the composition and powers of the legislative branch of the
federal government. Moreover, the three-fifths clause gave the South an
additional bonus. Not only was the South's interest in slaves to be
counted in determining the distribution of power in the legislative
branch, but the same formula would be used in determining the weight
of Southern votes in the election of the chief of the executive branch,
the President.
D. Election of the President
The Constitution did not provide for direct election of the President by the populace, but instead for indirect election by a college of
electors appointed from each state. The number of electors would be
determined based on the number of senators and representatives to
which the state was entitled in Congress. 17 0 Thus, just as the threefifths clause granted the South additional representation in Congress,
the clause also added to Southern influence in the selection of the
President.
This convoluted method of selecting a President was the product of
compromise between those who favored popular election and those who
favored appointment by the Congress. 17 1 Roger Sherman of Connecticut
and James Wilson of Pennsylvania championed the two opposing positions. Sherman was "for the appointment by the Legislature, and for
making [the President] absolutely dependent on that body"; an inde72
pendent executive, Sherman believed, was the essence of "tyranny.'
Wilson was "for an election by the people;" experience, Wilson believed, had shown "that an election of the first magistrate by the people
at large, was both a convenient and successful mode.' 173
Both positions had their detractors at the Convention. Pennsylvania's Gouverneur Morris proposed that a President appointed by Con170. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, 2. The provisions state:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall
. . . be elected, as follows
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress.

Id.
171. These were not the only methods of selection considered by the Convention. The Convention overwhelmingly rejected Elbridge Gerry's motion that the President be elected by the
equal votes of the states' governors. 2 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 1117-18. New York's Alexander Hamilton, arguing that "no good [executive] could be established on Republican principles,"
id. at 1121, proposed an executive with life tenure, to be elected by electors chosen from election
districts into which the states would be divided. Id. at 1123-24. Hamilton's proposal was never
reduced to a motion, nor was it voted on by the Convention.
172. Id. at 1101.
173. Id.
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gress would be "the mere creature of the Legislature. . . . [the
President] ought to be elected by the people at large, by the freeholders
of the Country. ' 17 4 Madison agreed with the need for an independent
executive branch and thought it "essential. . . that the appointment of
the Executive should either be drawn from some source, or held by
some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard to the Legislature.' 1 75 James Wilson added his belief that "[t]he appointment to
great offices" should not be left to the legislature, for this process was
"the most corruptly managed of any that had been committed to legis76
lative bodies.'
Pierce Butler of South Carolina argued, however, that popular elec7
tion would be "so complex and unwieldy so as to disgust the States.'
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts also was opposed to a popular election. He believed that the people were "uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men."' 7 8 Virginia's George Mason similarly
believed that popular election simply was not practicable. He maintained that
it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The
extent of the Country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite
capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.'""

Thus, delegates from both North and South were divided about the
merits of popular election versus legislative appointment of the President. Although much of the Convention debate on this issue represented an honest quest for a selection method that favored good
government,8 0 sectional issues continued to influence the discussions.
Virginia's Governor Randolph alluded to these sectional issues when he
spoke in favor of a tripartite executive, "to be drawn from different portions of the Country."'"' North Carolina's Hugh Williamson stressed
the inherent danger of a sole executive with veto power and argued that
the "essential difference of interests between the Northern and Southern States" required a tripartite executive. 82
174. Id. at 1126. Moreover, Morris warned, "If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of
intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals;
real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment." Id.
175. Id. at 1136.
176. Id. at 1128.
177. Id. at 1151. Nor was Butler enamored of election by the Congress: "The two great evils
to be avoided are cabal at home, and influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if the
Election be made by the National Legislature." Id.
178. Id. at 1137.
179. Id. at 1128.
180. See generally id. at 1094-1184.
181. Id. at 1112; see also id. at 1104.
182. Id. at 1143. Williamson had other reasons for desiring a three-headed executive:
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Sectional issues bore directly upon Southern opposition to popular
election. Many Southern delegates opposed popular election because
they feared that "[tihe most populous States by combining in favor of
the same individual will be able to carry their points."' 3 This fear was
not inconsistent with the Convention's expectation that population
movement would favor the Southern States. Regardless of the relative
degrees of population growth, a significant portion of the Southern population would be slaves who, as the Convention delegates recognized,
would "have no suffrage,' 84 and therefore no voice in a popular
election.
Madison spoke directly to the problem and to its solution.
Whatever the relative merit of popular election,8 5 Madison stated that
"[t]here was one difficulty. . . of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive
in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no
influence in the election on the score of Negroes. "186 While population
movement and the passage of more liberal access to the ballot might
ameliorate the South's disadvantage, popular election of the President
would, nonetheless, require the sacrifice of Southern interests.8 7 The
answer as Madison saw it was the "substitution of electors[, which] obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole liable to fewest
objections."' '
In the end, popular election was voted down by the Convention' s9
in favor of election by joint ballot of the Congress. 190 Madison pronounced this solution "not. . . unreasonable," even though it increased
the power of small states.' 9 ' While small states received an advantage
Another objection against a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective King, and will feel
the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for
the succession of his children. It was pretty certain he thought that we should at some time or
other have a King; but he wished no precaution to be omitted that might postpone the event
as long as possible.

Id.
183. Id. at 1127 (remarks of Charles Pinckney).
184. Id. at 1128 (remarks of Hugh Williamson).
185. Id. at 1136-37. Madison stated:
The people at large were. . . the fittest [source for appointment]. It would be as likely as any
that could be devised to produce an Executive Magistiate of distinguished Character. The
people generally could only know and vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him
as object of general attention and esteem.
Id. at 1137. All tolled, "[w]ith all its imperfections he liked this best." Id. at 1150.
186. Id. at 1137; see also id. at 1150.
187. Id. at 1150.
188. Id. at 1137.
189. Id. at 1159-60.
190. Id. at 1155, 1160.
191. Id. at 1160.
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by adding in the ballot for President an equal number of Senate votes
to the House votes proportioned to the population, the South, as a region, gained more. The joint ballot compromise meant that the South
had stretched its slave representation advantage beyond one-half of the
legislative branch into the entire power to elect the President. When
the Convention approved the proposal of an electoral college apportioned in the same manner as the state delegations to Congress,192
Northern interests once again had combined with Southern desires to
achieve the maximum protection for Southern interests in slavery by
giving political advantage to the South.
Significantly, the President retained the power to control the personnel of the third branch of government, the judiciary. Vested in the
President was the duty, "by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, [to] appoint.

.

.Judges of the [S]upreme Court."19 By exten-

sion, therefore, the South's influence over the election of the Chief Executive would result in increased Southern influence over the judicial
branch, especially over the Supreme Court, whose opinions on matters
of federal law would be supreme. In a case before the Supreme Court
regarding slavery, the South reasonably might hope that Southern Presidents or Presidents beholden to the South might have appointed
Southern judges or judges otherwise friendly to Southern interests. The
South also might hope that if its anticipated power in Congress ever
failed, or if its influence over the office of the President had diminished,
that the South's influence over the Supreme Court, developed during
prior years of influence over the other branches, might help to maintain
slavery.
Eventually, the Nation rid itself of the cancer of slavery in spite of
the Framers of the Constitution, who actively protected Southern interests in slavery by their adoption of the 1808 clause, the fugitive slave
clause, and the export tax clauses, and who intended to protect slavery
passively through the three-fifths clause. Moreover, the Framers of the
Constitution delivered to the white South an influence beyond its numbers over the executive branch and, by extension, over the Supreme
Court. Regardless of the ultimate fate of slavery in the United States,
the Framers of the Constitution stand condemned by their intent to
deliver to the South the means of the federal government to maintain
slavery so long as the South desired to maintain it. Only developments
unforeseen by the Framers forestalled perpetual control over the slavery issue by the Southern States, who had political incentives-created
by the Constitution itself-to maintain slavery.
192. Id. at 1165-66, 1179.
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
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THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME: CALCULATION OR MISCALCULATION?

Beyond any doubt, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
created a document rife with compromise over the issue of slavery. It
may be, as Assistant Attorney General Reynolds has argued, that these
compromises resolved for the Northern delegates a Hobson's choice of
either acquiescing to the protection of slavery or forgoing union.194 That
this choice existed does not detract from Justice Marshall's criticism of
the Constitution as a document flawed by a failure of "wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice."' 95 For the Framers did not simply trade a
limited protection of slavery in order to ensure union; instead they delivered to the white South advantages in the very structure of the new
government intended to give the South veto power over federal regulation of slavery. In effect, the Framers delivered to the South the power
to maintain slavery as long as it chose, regardless of antislavery sentiment in the North. Thus, the Framers built the system of individual
liberty that characterizes this Nation and the structure that protects it
on a foundation not of freedom, but of slavery. That this foundation
would be rebuilt into one based on freedom was not inevitable, for the
Framers intended that the South, at whose insistence the slavery compromises were accomplished, would control the federal levers of change.
If Justice Marshall's criticism of the Constitution and its Framers
has borne the need to explore the Convention and the ratification debates, his criticism also raises questions about what happened after the
ratification of the Constitution. The Framers' expectations of population growth, and thus of power in Congress, were not met. Population
did not grow toward the South and Southwest, but instead toward the
North and Northwest."9" Thus, unanticipated population trends raise
further questions, not of the intent but of the effect of the Constitution
on the conduct of slavery in the Nation. If the South did not obtain a
majority in the House of Representatives, 97 then what advantage did it
obtain? In the House, did votes attributable to the South's slave population affect or even change the course of national policy? Were Presidents elected by slave votes? 198 Was Southern influence over the federal
government, magnified by its slave population, responsible for Southern
dominance of the Supreme Court? 99 If, as Justice Marshall has argued,
Another View, supra note 35, at 1347.
Marshall, supra note 2, at 1338.
196. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 121, at 22.
197. See 2 id. at 1085.
198. Of the fourteen men elected President before the Civil War, seven were Southerners.
Southern Presidents governed the Nation for forty-one of the seventy-one years of constitutional
government through 1860. 1988 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 320-22.
199. Only from 1796 to 1798 and from 1829 to 1837 did the full complement of the Supreme
194.
195.
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the Framers' compromises on slavery render suspect their sense of wisdom, foresight, and justice, then answers to these questions can tell
much about the degree to which the Framers lacked these qualities.
Answers to these questions also can tell us whether the Framers'
failure of wisdom, foresight, and justice, and their sacrifice of political
morality for political expedience embodied merely constitutional impediments to change, or served primarily as a model for later governmental action respecting slavery. Indications that the Framers' moral
compromise represented a model for future governmental action surfaced in an event that took place in 1861, after the secession of the
Southern States had begun20 0 and as the Nation stood on the brink of a
great military conflict that would either maintain or dissolve the Union.
On March 2, 1861, two days before Abraham Lincoln took office as
President, Congress passed a joint resolution to amend the Constitution
to include a thirteenth amendment:
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to
Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of
said State.20 1

Congress had not passed this resolution in a vacuum. Lincoln had
won the 1860 Presidential election without the benefit of a single
Southern or border state.20 2 The platform of Lincoln's Republican
Party had advocated no further geographic extension of slavery, even
though the platform promised no interference with slavery's existence
within the slave states themselves.2 03 Nonetheless, within three months
of Lincoln's November victory, seven states had seceded.20 4 The need
for a compromise to save the Union was apparent.20 5
Court contain a majority of non-Southern Justices. H. ABRAHAM,
LITICAL

JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:

A Po-

71-115, 384-87 (2d ed. 1985).
2 A. NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF LINCOLN 318-62 (1950).

HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT

200.
201.
202.

J. RES. 13, 12 Stat. 251 (1861).
2 A. NEVINS, supra note 200, at 312-13; see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO
U.S. ELECTIONS 232 (1975).
203. See K. PORTER & D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1960, at 31-32 (2d ed.
1961). The 1860 Republican party platform promised to slave states that the maintenance of each
state's right to "control its own domestic institutions ...
is essential to . . .the perfection and
endurance of our political fabric," but declared as "dangerous political heresy" the holding of
Scott v. Sandford, which had declared unconstitutional congressional legislation banning slavery
from United States territories. Id. Moreover, the platform "den[iedj the authority of Congress, of a
territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the
United States." Id.; see also E. FONER, supra note 89, at 261-317.

204. 2 A. NEVINS, supra note 200, at 318-28; see also 3 J. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
159 (1928).
205. "Compromise" in the context of the slavery issue meant capitulation. The history of

STATES

sectional conflict before the Civil War is the history of Southern demands for extension of slave

territory and of limits on the federal government's ability to affect that extension. It is also the
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Attention was focused on the proposals of Kentucky Senator John
Crittendon. Crittendon had proposed a series of constitutional amendments dealing extensively with Southern concerns over slavery. These
amendments included: (1) the extension of the Missouri Compromise
line to California, prohibiting slavery above the line but protecting slavery below it; (2) a prohibition on the abolition of slavery in any federal
enclave inside a slave state, including the District of Columbia so long
as Virginia or Maryland maintained slaves; (3) a limitation on federal
interference with interstate transportation of slaves and a toughening of
the federal position on fugitive slaves; and (4) a prohibition on constitutional amendments tampering with slavery. 06 Lincoln, however, steered
20 7
his party away from acceptance of Crittendon's compromise proposal.
All the proposed amendments were rejected except the last, which
formed the basis for what originally was proposed as the thirteenth
amendment.0 8 The entire Crittendon proposal was more like Northern
surrender to the slave states rather than compromise; but the proposed
thirteenth amendment provided the opportunity, if the South would
have accepted it, to maintain the Union, though at the cost of affirming
what the Constitution of 1787 had only implied-that slavery would
continue in the United States so long as the Southern States desired.
Lincoln implicitly approved of the proposed amendment in his inaugural address when he repeated a pledge from an earlier speech: "I
have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution
of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right
to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.''2°e Thus, in 1861, a President unbeholden to the South for his election and a Congress from
which many Southern members had resigned offered the South the
same contract that the Northern delegates to the Constitutional Convention had sealed with their Southern brethren: Continued union in
exchange for continued slavery. Only the South's intransigence led to
the refusal of the new deal, the subsequent Civil War, and the end of
slavery.
The story of the proposed thirteenth amendment tells less about
history of Northern surrender to the demands. See generally W. COOPER, THE SOUTH AND THE
POLITICS OF SLAVERY, 1828-1856 (1978); A. CRAVEN, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN NATIONALISM, 18481861 (1953); G. MOORE, THE MISSOURI CONTROVERSY, 1819-1821 (1953); D. ROBINSON, supra note 73;
A. Simpson, The PoliticalSignificance of Slave Representation,1787-1821, 7 J.S. HisT. 315 (1941).
Thus, demand for compromise amounted to a demand for the North to capitulate.
206. S.J. RES. 50, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. (1860), reprinted in E. McPHERSON, THE POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE GREAT REBELLION 64-65 (1865);
A. NEVINS, supra note 200, at 390-91.
207. D. POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CRISIS 156-87 (1942).

208. 2 A. NEVINS, supra note 200, at 397-410.
209. 6 J. NICOLAY & J. HAY, COMPLETE WORKS

OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

170 (1894).

see also 2
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the influence of slave representation in Congress than it tells about
slavery's influence on politics during the period prior to the Civil War.
The story confirms Justice Marshall's criticism of the 1787 Constitution: That the document as written originally was flawed, perhaps fatally, by compromises with racism and slavery. The story of the
proposed thirteenth amendment, however, goes beyond the Marshall
thesis by suggesting that this Nation's fundamental interest in union
outweighed its interest in liberty and equality, not merely at the time of
the Constitutional Convention but even beyond.
V.

CONCLUSION

The implications of Justice Marshall's thesis are simple and powerful. First, under the slavery compromises at the Constitutional Convention, an extra measure of political power was delivered to the South
based on its slave population. The Framers intended that this political
power would allow the South to protect and defend its interest in slavery. Second, this power constituted an incentive for the South to maintain slavery, for the maintenance of slavery protected Southern political
power. If these implications are correct, then Justice Marshall's critics
simply were incorrect in asserting that the Framers left open the possibility of eliminating slavery through constitutional amendment. Further, if the implications of Justice Marshall's thesis are correct, the
beauty of the Constitution, as his critics described it, is irrelevant to the
discussion of slavery; for the Framers left closed the possibility that the
constitutional structure would ever liberate slaves without the active
agreement and participation in the amending process by those states
that had a political interest in maintaining slavery.
The Framers chose to sell the soul of the Nation-the promise of
the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal"-in
exchange for the life of the Nation as a unified whole. Perhaps, however, as indicated by the story of the thirteenth amendment as it might
have been, the Framers should not be singled out for their political surrender to the evil of slavery. Justice Marshall's thesis can be tested by
empirical data that can confirm or deny the thesis's accuracy. These
data also can determine whether those who followed the Framers as
decisionmakers also merit criticism on the issue of slavery and union.
These data exist in decennial census counts related to apportionment;
in the votes of Congress and congressional committees on issues related
to slavery, such as territorial expansion, fugitive slaves, tariffs, and the
enforcement of regulations forbidding foreign imports of slaves after
1808; and in the records of Presidential elections.
Research into these data may reveal just how much the Congresses
and Presidents that followed the framing of the Constitution were
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bound by the South's extra votes in the House of Representatives and
in the electoral college, and how much they were bound instead by lack
of desire and failure of will. This research also may reveal whether Justice Marshall was correct to criticize the Framers for selling the Nation's soul, or whether instead his criticism should have been that the
Nation's soul simply was incapable of salvation.

